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LiNK Statement on Kim Jong-il’s Death and the Future of North Korea

Kim Jong-il’s Legacy

According to North Korean state media Kim Jong-il died on the morning of December 17th 2011, after seventeen years of rule. He leaves behind an impoverished country that is widely recognized as the most repressive on earth.

After two decades spent preparing for power, Kim Jong-il took over from his father Kim Il-sung in 1994 at a time of international and domestic turmoil. The recent collapse of the Soviet Union had removed an important military ally and vital sources of aid and trade, and North Korea was on the brink of a famine that would kill a million of its people. At the time, many thought that in this environment a succession to a leader lacking in the legitimacy of the nation’s ‘founding father’ Kim Il-sung might result in North Korea’s weakening and collapse. However Kim Jong-il and the North Korean ruling elite were able to use brutally effective systems of political control to repress the people and ensure the maintenance of the regime, while under the ‘Military First’ mantra North Korea developed and tested nuclear weapons and raised the status of the military even higher.

The collapse of the socialist economy in the early years of Kim Jong-il’s reign drastically transformed North Korean society. The famine caused immense human suffering and forced people to leave their factories and work units to try to find ways to provide themselves and others with the food and goods that the state could no longer provide. This led to a grass-roots marketization of the economy, and the market eventually replaced the state as the primary source of food and grew to encompass a broader range of goods and services, spreading the profit motive throughout North Korean society.

Grass-roots marketization also introduced avenues for information flows that were outside the regime’s control. Refugees that left the country over the past decade have also contributed to this by staying in contact with family members inside North Korea, sending in money that feeds the markets and information from the outside world that is helping to break increasing numbers of North Koreans free from the propaganda and isolation imposed on them for decades. During Kim Jong-il’s reign, the North Koreans who have made the greatest gains are those who have successfully engaged in market activities in defiance of the regime and North Korean socialist ideology.

Kim Jong-il and the regime used ruthlessly efficient repression and fear to rule out any political dissent, but they struggled to control the changes emerging in the economy and were never able to successfully roll back marketization. One of the last major economic policies under Kim Jong-il was the currency reform of late 2009, which was designed to destroy private wealth and regain state control over the economy. However it caused so much disruption and resentment that the regime had to make unprecedented apologies and backtrack on the policy.

In the days since Kim Jong-il’s death, North Korean state media has made sure to show the world images of North Koreans distraught at the loss of their leader, recalling scenes of the people mourning the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994. But this is an attempt to mask the transformation that has happened in North Korean society during Kim Jong-il’s reign. North Korean refugees say that while there was a lot of genuine sadness when Kim Il-sung died, the majority of North Koreans feel very differently towards the leadership now. For the vast majority of North Koreans life was very difficult under Kim Jong-il, and the people’s relationship with the state has been irreversibly changed. According to refugees, many of the outward displays of grief for Kim Jong-il are performed not out of genuine sadness but because of the very real fear that if the required emotion is not displayed then individuals could come under suspicion of being anti-regime and face severe repercussions.

What Next for North Korea and the North Korean People?

Kim Jong-un, the third and youngest son of Kim Jong-il, was marked out as the heir-apparent at a Workers’ Party Conference in September 2010. Since then he has gradually been elevated in the state media, and after Kim Jong-il’s death he was named as the ‘Great Successor’ by North Korean state media to ensure there was not any doubt.

Thought to be just 27 or 28 years old, Kim Jong-un is largely unknown to the North Korean people as well as to the outside world. Recent North Korean defectors tell us that there has not been a lot of propaganda about Kim Jong-un over the past year. What propaganda there has been has presented him as a military figure, as exemplified by his ‘promotion’ to four star general. By contrast, Kim Jong-il was much better known to the North Korean people when he came to power in 1994. The people are now uncertain and anxious for the future of their country, and recent defectors tell us that many North Koreans fear that the son will continue in just the same mold as the father, so that conditions will stay the same or even get worse.

Kim Jong-un has no accomplishments of his own and so his legitimacy depends entirely on his family lineage. This will constrain his ability to embark on new policy initiatives that would represent a break with his father and grandfather. He also still lacks a sufficient power-base of his own to overcome institutional resistance within the regime against bold policy moves. At this point it is still unclear who holds what kind of power behind the scenes in Pyongyang, but at least for the time being power is likely to be more diffuse and shared by a collective leadership, with Kim Jong-un as the figurehead. This new leadership is likely to prioritize unity and stability, again suggesting a continuation of current policies.

It is highly unlikely that there will be any kind of bottom-up ‘Arab Spring’ type revolution in North Korea in the short to medium term, as the level of fear and repression is too high and a lack of civil society mechanisms makes it extremely difficult if not impossible for the people to organize against the regime. Early reports after Kim Jong-il’s death indicated that the regime had moved to restrict cross-border movement and market activity. Coming at a time of already rapidly rising food prices, these restrictions, along with the disruption caused by staged political events marking Kim Jong-il’s death and the succession, mean that life is likely to get even harder for the North Korean people in the short term. This underlines that even with a change in leadership, the regime is likely to continue prioritizing stability and control above all else.

LiNK’s Work Will Continue

While the death of the leader is a significant event, the regime has always been much bigger than one man. We unfortunately do not see any reason to believe that the lives of the North Korean people will improve in the near future because Kim Jong-il has died. It is important to remember that up to 200,000 North Koreans are still detained in political prison camps and 24 million North Koreans still suffer under the most repressive regime in existence today.

After the current news frenzy dies down, the harsh reality of life for the North Korean people will continue. We will maintain our dedication to the North Korean people and make sure that they are not ignored amongst all the concern over regional security issues and nuclear weapons. We will call on the international community to ensure that a focus on the North Korean people, and serious discussions on human rights and humanitarian issues, will be a central part of any engagement with North Korea under the new leadership. We will also continue to pursue strategies that will increase the human security of the North Korean people. We will do this because we believe that making progress towards the kind of North Korea that everybody wants to see depends on taking a long-term, people-focused approach.

Although Kim Jong-il’s death ushers in a period of increased uncertainty, opportunities to help the North Korean people do still exist. We will continue in our work, providing assistance to North Koreans where they can be reached, helping them to escape and find freedom, and pursuing an end to this crisis.

With hope,   

LiNK

 

LiNK: North Korean Refugees on Kim Jong-il’s Death and the Succession

The sudden death of Kim Jong-il has triggered a deluge of early commentary and analysis on what this may mean for North Korea and the region. The North Koreans themselves are of course the people who will be affected most by this development, but the voice of the North Korean people has been severely lacking.  While the regime has always been comprised of much more than one man, the death of the leader does usher in a new period of increased uncertainty for the North Korean people.

It is impossible to go inside North Korea to interview the people regarding their true feelings on the situation. However LiNK has spoken with refugees who have recently left the country. It should be noted that North Korean refugees cannot be considered to be necessarily representative of the general population, as the majority have come from border regions and therefore their views may be different from those living in Pyongyang or elsewhere.

LiNK works on the ground helping North Korean refugees who have escaped into China, bringing them out through a ‘modern-day underground railroad’ to its shelter in Southeast Asia where refugees can then seek safe resettlement in third nations. Prior to Kim Jong-il’s death, we had interviewed refugees who came through our shelter on their attitudes towards the succession. Some of the refugees had left North Korea as recently as November 2011. Over the past few hours we have contacted further refugees for their comments and thoughts upon hearing about Kim Jong-il’s death.

North Korean Refugees on the Succession:

“Some North Korean people believe that if Kim Jong-un takes over North Korean politics, he will be even worse than his father.”

“Kim Jong-un has been presented to us by the state media as a military figure.”

“Of course, people think badly of the succession. How could you think it is a good thing? The Government is not providing the people with any kind of standard of living.”

“The North Korean people just hope to live in freedom and to live well.”

North Korean refugees’ reaction to the death of Kim Jong-il:

“The North Korean people will currently be putting on feigned shows of sadness. This is very different to the death of Kim Il-sung. Kim Il-sung founded the country and the people think that he did a lot for them. Times have been hard during Kim Jong-il’s reign. People have woken up and are much more aware of the reality of the country and the leadership now. People will outwardly be showing sadness but inwardly they will feel very differently. The people fear that anything but the required show of sadness could get them killed… The most likely outcome of the succession is that Kim Jong-un will continue in the same mold as his father.”
– Shin Jong-wook, M, 20.*

“This is not a happy or a sad event for me. But it is a big moment. This will be a shocking moment for the North Korean people. But there will not be as much grief as when Kim Il-sung died. Of course, people will have to pretend to be sad, and people may get caught up in the atmosphere, but it is not true sadness.”
– Kim Moon-soo, M, 21.

“I worry about what this will mean for my relatives back inside and for the North Korean people. I fear that the relatives of defectors will be persecuted more. They are closing the markets and there are bound to be a lot of staged political events, so for the people that are already struggling things are going to get even harder.”
– Park Yun-joo, F, 31.

“I didn’t feel anything in particular when I heard the news. But I am worried that my family in North Korea will suffer because of the change in leadership.”
– Lee Sunghee, F, 39.

“It was a big surprise. I don’t know what the next leadership will be like, so its a big worry. Some people will be sad because the leader of the country has died. That is normal. But some people will probably be glad that he has died.”
– Park Il-hyung, M, 37.

“I don’t care that Kim Jong-il is dead. In North Korea now, the norm dictates that everyone has to cry. But people don’t have any positive feelings towards Kim Jong-il. The majority of people will be faking their tears.”
– Nam Gum-sook, F, 19.

“If you don’t cry in North Korea after the leader dies, then you could come under suspicion as being against the Government. Then you have to live with that label and suspicion for the rest of your life.”
– Kang Bohee, F, 21.

 

*The names of refugees have been changed to protect their identities and ensure the security of relatives still inside North Korea.

Weekly News Brief – 29 October 2011

NK INTERNAL

• The NK Govt reportedly has banned 200 of its citizens in Libya from returning home. They’ll hear about Gadhafi’s death anyway.
• Rumourmill: KJU married?
• Recommended: Daily NK’s ‘NK People Speak, 2011” available in pdf here. And Haggard blogs about it.
• Daily NK: Its the Jangmadang, Stupid. “With the introduction of the market system to North Korea, as long as you have Yuan, Dollars etc, you can buy absolutely anything… while the market has been replacing the government’s role, the power of the government has been shrinking.”
• ORNK: SK dramas entertain bored Pyongyang housewives. Boring propaganda on state television is driving demand for foreign media, and people are gathering to watch the dramas in groups.
• Daily NK on the dark humour of NKoreans. As the male-dominated state socialist system flounders and women are active in the markets, women are referring to their ‘nam-pyeon’ (husband) as ‘bul-pyeon’ (inconvenience) and people who manage to get repaid money they are owed are called ‘war heroes’.
• DongA Ilbo with two pieces on smuggling networks working inside NK.
• NYT on NK’s economic strategy of seeking foreign cash while avoiding real reform.
• 38 North – NK: An up and coming IT outsourcing destination.

FOOD AID & FOOD SECURITY

• The price of rice keeps on climbing.
• UN’s Valerie Amos: “6 million NKoreans urgently need food aid but the world is not giving enough.”

REFUGEES

• Daily NK: NK NSA agents were involved in the sting operation that caught 20-35 refugees in Shenyang, China.
• CS Monitor piece on Tim Peters, underground railroad activist.
• LA Times on a defector sending warm socks into NK by balloon. He himself was motivated to defect after reading a SK leaflet he had found.
• Hanawon opened a new prep school for NK refugees.

HUMAN RIGHTS

• Online petition for the ‘Daughter of Tongyeong’ and her two daughters, thought to be in a political prison camp in NK, calling for them to be repatriated to SK.
• UNGA 66 (2011) SR report on NKHR.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS & SECURITY

• Nothing major happened in the US-NK talks for talks, but the Chinese, who are trying to do their bit, lauded it anyway.
• The Obama administration is deliberately avoiding going to the Hill with its new NK point-men in order to reduce public debate and political costs, because engagement, while deemed necessary, is unlikely to bring any big political wins. The USG has also quietly dropped the policy language of ‘strategic patience’ and may now be going for something like ‘management strategy’.
• The US will resume searching for MIA remains in NK.
• The defense chiefs of the US and SK joined rhetorical forces in Seoul to deter NK from provocations.
• LMB will meet with Medvedev in Russia next week.
• SK and NK historians will meet to discuss jointly excavating an ancient palace in NK.
• Russian NK expert Vorontsov: Russia, wanting to be more integrated into regional cooperation processes in East Asia, has moved decisively closer to NK.
• Lewis, Hayes and Bruce on the slow motion SPT engagement.
• Lankov suggests Sunshine Policy mk.2 aimed at the junior cadres.

MISC.

• Lafforgue: Old Kaesong, Kaesong housing, Kaesong Industrial complex from afar, the Choco Pie effect in action (red box stuck in tree). Red star human fresco. “Sex toy in a Buddhist temple – North Korea”. Selling in the street (and again). Mobile phone user, mobile phone mast.
• North Korean state media headline of the week: KCNA Slams U.S. Diplomatic Chief’s Rigmaroles about DPRK′s Human Rights Record
• KJI’s grandson, fed up of being hounded by the press in Bosnia, reached new heights of irony by lamenting his ‘guilt by association’ to the NK leader.
• PRI: SK youth not interested in reunification. Also, Ryu on SK’s unification education policy.
• FP: Pyongyang Rock City.
• PBS on getting news out of NK.